



Orange
Cyberdefense

802.1x NAC & BYPASS TECHNIQUES

Hack in Paris 2017
Valérian LEGRAND

ABOUT

- Valérian LEGRAND, Security consultant and Penetration Tester at Orange CyberDefense
 - Breaking things is my job
- Why this research ?
 - 802.1x often disabled for penetration tests
 - Provides a good excuse for bad devs & admins
 - “Great you found X critical vulnerabilities... but we disabled 802.1x for the penetration test so it’s not that bad !”
 - Needed for specific Red Team engagements
- Also, huge thanks for the help to :
 - Andrei Dumitrescu (twitter : @_dracu_)
 - Quentin Biguenet
 - Florent “KASH” Lalegerie
 - But also : Fabien, Nicolas, Pierre, Simon, Slim, etc...

WHAT WE GONNA TALK ABOUT

Wired 802.1X
How the hell does it work ?

A Brief Overview
of 802.1X
Bypasses

FENRIR

Goddammit,
We Want Shells !


WIRED 802.1X

- IEEE standard originally created in 2001
- **Physical port-based** network access control
 - The new device has to authenticate in order to access the network beyond the switch
- 3 roles involved
 - **SUPPLICANT** : The new device
 - **AUTHENTICATOR** : The switch (or Wireless AP)
 - **AUTHENTICATION SERVER** : The server responsible for checking credentials (Usually a RADIUS server)




THE HAPPY EAP FAMILY

- **EAP** = **E**xtensible **A**uthentication **P**rotocol
 - Defines authentication message formats
 - LOTS of different formats
 - EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PSK, etc...
 - Some are very weak (Seriously, don't use LEAP)
- EAP is NOT a wire protocol
- EAP messages are encapsulated by other protocols
 - **EAPoL** = **EAP** over **LAN**
 - **PEAP** = **P**rotected **EAP** (mainly used on Windows systems)
 - ...




PORT-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

- The **Authenticator** defines **2** logical states per physical port
 - **Uncontrolled** State
 - **Controlled** State
- The **uncontrolled** state allows 802.1x frames only
 - The Authenticator forwards the frames to the Authentication Server
- The **controlled** state acts like a “normal” port
 - The network is fully accessible
 - From this point, **any packet** can go wherever it needs to on the network without authentication !



GIMME ACCESS, YOU SWITCH !

Standard base
authentication scheme



A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF 802.1X BYPASSES

BYPASS BY DESIGN

Just a quick note about what is NOT 802.1x protection

- 802.1x only acts as a **gatekeeper**
 - If a device is compromised when already connected to the LAN, 802.1x protection is useless
 - Social engineers don't care about 802.1x (think malicious attachments for example)
 - 802.1x is not a solution to protect a LAN against **BYOD hazards**
 - The compromised device will authenticate against 802.1x as usual
- It is also possible to **retrieve credentials/certificates** on legitimate devices
 - Mimikatz (Benjamin Delpy)
- Note : bruteforce is not possible
 - Temporization rules on authentication server



SOME DEVICES JUST WANT TO SEE THE NETWORK BURN


BYPASS - The easy way :

- Some devices do not support 802.1x
 - You wish they do, but they don't...
 - Usually : **old** devices, **low-grade** equipment (printers), or very **specific** systems (security cameras)
- These devices can be unplugged and their Ethernet port hijacked in order to access the network without the need to authenticate
- Solution : **MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB)**
 - (Seriously, who puts “bypass” in the name of a security feature ???)
- MAB uses the device's MAC address to validate its identity
 - The authenticator first tries to authenticate the new device by sending EAP Request-Identity messages
 - After 3 unsuccessful attempts, the authenticator falls back to MAB and sends the device's MAC address to the authentication server

THE REAL BYPASS : TRAFFIC INJECTION

BYPASS - The hard way :

- 802.1x provides Network Access Control
 - It provides authentication over who can access the network
 - It does NOT provide traffic encryption (many people believe it does)
 - It does NOT provide per-packet authentication




- Traffic Injection : spoof a legitimate and authenticated supplicant's MAC and IP address to fake legitimate packets
 - Still works today in a vast majority of cases !
 - Especially works in traditional Windows environments

FENRIR

FENRIR & TRAFFIC INJECTION

- Traffic Injection is the most reliable technique to **physically** attack a 802.1x network
- This led to the development of **FENRIR**
 - Traffic tapping and injection
 - Stealth
 - Auto-configuration
 - Collision issue avoidance
 - Modularity & extensibility
 - Full control over the traffic
 - Reverse connection capabilities
 - Not developed in Java !
- The goal was to obtain a tool “out-of-the-box” that could be useful during a penetration test (including Red Team)
- Requirements :
 - A laptop with 2 physical interfaces (external netcards work great !)
 - Python & Scapy


HOW IT WORKS



- We need that :
 - Frames at "A" : appear to be coming from the legitimate host
 - Frames at "B" : appear to be coming from the network
 - Frames at "C" : appear to be addressed to the legitimate host
 - Frames at "D" : appear to be addressed to the network


- FENRIR captures frames on both physical interfaces and rewrites headers to make the FENRIR host disappear
 - Frames from/to the legitimate host are forwarded
 - (You can also do whatever you want to do on them too here)
 - Frames from/to FENRIR are rewritten

HOW IT WORKS




- Step 1 :
 - FENRIR acts as a wire and let the legitimate device authenticate itself to the switch
 - ➔ Switch's port state changes from uncontrolled to controlled
- Step 1.5 : optional automatic configuration
 - Passive tapping to gather legitimate host's MAC/IP addresses, TTL, etc...
- Step 2 :
 - FENRIR will perform per frame analysis (for legitimate and rogue hosts' frames)
 - Frames from/to rogue host will be rewritten
 - ➔ We need to keep the legitimate host's network access up in order to bypass periodic re-authentications

HOW IT WORKS




Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1				
Entry n°2				
Entry n°3				

HOW IT WORKS




Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1	192.168.1.42	5555	192.168.1.10	443
Entry n°2				
Entry n°3				

HOW IT WORKS




Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1	192.168.1.42	5555	192.168.1.10	443
Entry n°2				
Entry n°3				

HOW IT WORKS



Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1	192.168.1.42	5555	192.168.1.10	443
Entry n°2	192.168.1.32	35180	192.168.201.30	80
Entry n°3				

HOW IT WORKS




From : 192.168.201.30 : 80
 To : 192.168.1.42 : 35180

IP: 192.168.1.32

Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1	192.168.1.42	5555	192.168.1.10	443
Entry n°2	192.168.1.32	35180	192.168.201.30	80
Entry n°3				



HOW IT WORKS



From : 192.168.201.30 : 80
To : 192.168.1.32 : 35180

Entry	IP address A	Port A	IP address B	Port B
Entry n°1	192.168.1.42	5555	192.168.1.10	443
Entry n°2	192.168.1.32	35180	192.168.201.30	80
Entry n°3				

FENRIR - DEMO



GODDAMMIT
WE WANT SHELLS




REVERSE CONNECTIONS

- FENRIR provides the possibility to **capture reverse connections** (connections initiated from the network)
 - Useful for :
 - **Reverse shells**
 - **Fake servers** (think Responder for example)
 - ...
- **Rules system**, “à la” iptables that can be added/deleted on the fly to allow interception of specific frames

```
Rule 1 :  
    port = 137  
    type = multi  
    proto = IP  
Rule 2 :  
    port = 5355  
    type = multi  
    proto = IP  
Rule 3 :  
    port = 80  
    type = multi  
    proto = IP
```


GOING WILD

- Once FENRIR is set up, you find yourself in a **perfect MitM spot**
 - A whole new world of network fun !
- **Attack modules ?**
 - Injecting malicious exe on the wire
 - Modifying network traffic for the legitimate host
 - Responder
 - ...
- Classic attacks
 - FENRIR works with all **TCP/UDP** tools (and new protocols can be added)
 - nmap
 - netcat
 - Metasploit
 - CrackmapExec
 - Empire
 - ...



GIMME SHELLS DEMO

TAKE AWAYS

- 802.1x protection is **great** (really it is), but is just **a brick in the wall**
- **Ways of bypassing it exist** - Do not consider your network secure because you implemented it ! 802.1x \neq physical access protection
- 802.1x protects the door but **not what goes through**
 - No encryption



(Does anyone realize this kid is eating sand?!?)

<https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/fenrir>